as evidence for a greatly different dualism, one which denies psychophysical lawlike correlation and asserts a kind of surveillance and control of the brain by "the self-conscious mind", despite some acting of the brain on "the self-conscious mind".
, to show why it has been supposed that the hypothesis is evidence against an identity theory of mind and brain and the theory of psychophysical lawlike correlation, and evidence for "the self-conscious mind"; What is maintained by the authors derives from two sets of findings (1.1 to 1.3 and 2.1 to 2.4 below) pertaining to neuronal activity and to the temporal order of a subject’s pairs of sensory experiences, and also from (3) findings having to do with a "primary" evoked potential in somatosensory cortex.
The research finding is to the effect that a conscious event happens before the relevant brain event.
This would be expected on the basis of 1.1 and 1.3.Reports of tests, however, were predominantly of experience for the skin stimulus beginning before experience for the cortical stimulus.(2.2) There is no such surprising order of conscious experiences reported with subcortical stimulation.(1.1) Experiments on human subjects, with their agreement, and in conjunction with surgical treatment, are said to show that after trains of stimulation are applied directly by inserted electrodes to postcentral cortex there is a considerable delay, up to about 0.5 sec after the beginning of the train, before cortical activity reaches "neuronal adequacy" for eliciting a conscious sensory experience.What is said to be delayed, to repeat, is precisely the physical condition of "neuronal adequacy", as distinct from the experience itself, whatever is to be said of its time. Patrick Galvin of Politico notes a couple of recent uses, such as Sen.